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ABSTRACT 
Since 2003 in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger the Supreme 
Court appeared to have established a relatively stable doctrine for applying 
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment in affirmative action 
cases. But more recently in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Se-
attle School District and Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin the Court 
has deviated from the expected results that doctrine would produce while 
still claiming to uphold the precedent from Gratz and Grutter. This Article 
describes the holdings in Gatz and Grutter, explains how the Court applied 
those decisions to Parents Involved and Fisher, and argues the once pre-
sumably stable doctrine was modified in 2014 with the Court’s holding in 
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Gratz v. Bollinger1 and Grutter v. Bollinger2 lay out the current approach 
to race-conscious admissions in education. That approach may have been 
slightly modified in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District3 and Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,4 although the 
Court claimed to have been applying the same standard—strict scrutiny—in 
each case. While the Court could modify that approach in subsequent cas-
es,5 the jurisprudence currently appears relatively stable. That appearance is 
deceptive, however, because the jurisprudence has already been changed 
sub silentio in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integra-
tion & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary 
(BAMN).6  
Part I of this Article discusses Grutter, Gratz, Parents Involved, and 
Fisher, noting how the same legal standard was applied when assessing the 
constitutionality of school policies employing express racial classifications 
to help determine who would be afforded an opportunity to attend a particu-
lar school. Whether the Court’s application of the standard was consistent 
across cases is controversial,7 although the Court at least claimed to be ap-
                                                             
1 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249–51, 280 (2003). 
2 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311, 343 (2003). 
3 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007). 
4 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421-22 (2013). 
5 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2209-10 (2016). 
6 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1650-1651 (2014). 
7 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (“Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for 
2
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol20/iss1/3
 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION INVIDIOUSNESS 3 
plying strict scrutiny across the board. Part II examines Schuette, noting 
how the Court subverts the accepted jurisprudence while claiming to apply 
it. The Article concludes that the Court must correct Schuette at its earliest 
opportunity, because the current jurisprudence exemplifies exactly what 
equal protections guarantees are designed to prevent. 
I. SCHOOL ADMISSIONS AND STRICT SCRUTINY 
The United States Supreme Court has examined several cases involving 
policies employing an express racial classification as a consideration in de-
termining who would receive an offer to attend a particular school.8 In each 
of the cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny. In three of those cases, the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the system at issue; in the others, the 
Court either remanded the case or struck down the policy.9 The differing 
results were at least arguably attributable to differences in the particular 
admissions policies employed by the state entities whose policies were 
challenged or, perhaps, a misapplication of the doctrine by a lower court.  
A. Gratz and Grutter 
Gratz involved an examination of the admissions policies of the Univer-
sity of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts.10 To assure 
acceptance, an applicant needed to have the requisite number of points on a 
scale of 150.11 Students receiving at least 100 points would receive an offer 
of admission.12 Points would be earned in a variety of categories.13 Students 
                                                                                                                                             
taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of 
the university. Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a 
university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.”); but see Grutter, 134 S. Ct. 
at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court, however, does not apply strict scrutiny. By trying to say 
otherwise, it undermines both the test and its own controlling precedents.”). 
8See generally Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244 (2003) ; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999); 
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 
(1974). 
9 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (showing where the Court upholds the race-based 
policy held by the school’s admissions); but see, Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999); Gratz v. Bol-
linger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Community Schools v. Seattle School District, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (show-
ing where the Court remands or strikes down the race-based policy held by the school’s admissions). 
10 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 257 (“Petitioners asserted that the LSA's use of race as a factor in admissions 
violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
11 Id. at 255. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 253. (OUA [Office of Undergraduate Admissions] considers a number of factors in making ad-
missions decisions, including high school grades, standardized test scores, high school quality, curricu-
lum strength, geography, alumni relationships, and leadership."). 
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belonging to a qualifying underrepresented minority group would receive 
20 points by virtue of their minority status.14 In contrast, a student with 
“‘extraordinary artistic talent’ rival[ing] that of Monet or Picasso … would 
receive, at most, five points.”15 
The Gratz Court explained, “[A]ll racial classifications reviewable under 
the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized.”16 Further, the ap-
propriate “standard of review [...] is not dependent on the race of those bur-
dened or benefited by a particular classification.”17 Thus, any individual “of 
whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject 
to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to 
unequal treatment under the strictest of judicial scrutiny.”18 Such scrutiny is 
very difficult to withstand because those defending the classification “must 
demonstrate that the University's use of race in its current admissions pro-
gram employs ‘narrowly tailored measures that further compelling govern-
mental interests.’”19 The Court found that “because the University's use of 
race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to 
achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admis-
sions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”20 
Justice O’Connor explained in her concurring opinion that “the proce-
dures employed by the University of Michigan's […] Office of Undergrad-
uate Admissions do not provide for a meaningful individualized review of 
applicants.”21 Because “every underrepresented minority applicant [was as-
signed] the same, automatic 20–point bonus without consideration of the 
particular background, experiences, or qualities of each individual appli-
cant,”22 the admissions decision for each applicant was “by and large, au-
tomatically determine[d].”23 
Just as the majority opinion suggested that race was overvalued com-
pared to artistic talent,24 Justice O’Connor implied that the Admissions Of-
                                                             
14 Id. at 271. ("The LSA's policy automatically distributes 20 points to every single applicant from an 
underrepresented minority' group, as defined by the University."). 
15 Id. at 273. 
16 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)). 
17 Id. (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224). 
18 Id. (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224). 
19 Id. (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224). 
20 Id. at 275. 
21 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
22 Id. at 276-77 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
23 Id. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
24 See id. at 273. 
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fice had not assigned appropriate weights to the different categories.25 “Alt-
hough the Office of Undergraduate Admissions does assign 20 points to 
some ‘soft’ variables other than race, the points available for other diversity 
contributions, such as leadership and service, personal achievement, and 
geographic diversity, are capped at much lower levels.”26 For example, “the 
most outstanding national high school leader could never receive more than 
five points for his or her accomplishments—a mere quarter of the points au-
tomatically assigned to an underrepresented minority solely based on the 
fact of his or her race.”27 Here, Justice O’Connor was at least implicitly 
suggesting that the University was overvaluing race as compared to some of 
the other categories upon which points would be awarded. 
Some racial classifications are permissible,28 although benign and ani-
mus-based racial classifications are subject to the same strict scrutiny. 
When closely examining the methods employed by the University, the 
Gratz Court apparently felt obliged to decide for itself which categories 
were worthy of receiving (up to) 20 points and which should receive few-
er.29 In addition, the Court implicitly and Justice O’Connor explicitly sug-
gested that there must be individualized differentiation within each catego-
ry.30 Thus, Justice O’Connor criticized Michigan’s program because “every 
underrepresented minority applicant [was assigned] the same, automatic 
20–point bonus without consideration of the particular background, experi-
ences, or qualities of each individual applicant.”31 She implied that it was 
important for admissions committees to “consider[] […] each applicant's 
individualized qualifications, including the contribution each individual's 
race or ethnic identity will make to the diversity of the student body, taking 
into account diversity within and among all racial and ethnic groups.”32 
                                                             
25 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring) ([T]he selection index, by setting up automatic, 
predetermined point allocations for the soft variables, ensures that the diversity contributions of appli-
cants cannot be individually assessed. This policy stands in sharp contrast to the law school’s admissions 
plan, which enables admissions officers to make nuanced judgments with respect to the contributions 
each applicant is likely to make to the diversity of the incoming class.”). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 ([T]he Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s nar-
rowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educa-
tional benefits that flow from a diverse student body.”). 
29 But see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 294 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“A nonminority applicant who scores highly in 
these other categories can readily garner a selection index exceeding that of a minority applicant who 
gets the 20-point bonus.”). 
30 Cf. id. at 293 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Grutter reaffirms the permissibility of individualized consider-
ation of race to achieve a diversity of students, at least where race is not assigned a preordained value in 
all cases.”). 
31 Id. at 276–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
32 Id. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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While Justice O’Connor was correct that the undergraduate admissions 
committee was using a kind of toggle switch in that a student would either 
be awarded twenty points or no points in this category, it is simply unclear 
what kinds of distinctions should be made when deciding how many points 
to award. Would someone who was bi-racial or multi-racial receive fewer 
points or more points? Which minority racial identities should in-
crease/decrease points?33 Should minorities whose skin color is darker re-
ceive more points?34 Perhaps the committee should assign differing num-
bers of points based on its assumptions about how particular minorities 
would contribute to viewpoint diversity,35 although the Court has been 
quick to criticize those who would attribute to a student a particular point of 
view on the basis of his/her race.36  
Gratz is helpfully contrasted with Grutter v. Bollinger, which involved 
the admissions policies of the University of Michigan Law School.37 Ad-
missions personnel would “evaluate each applicant based on all the infor-
mation available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of rec-
ommendation, and an essay describing the ways in which the applicant will 
contribute to the life and diversity of the Law School.”38 As a testament to 
the individualized nature of the assessment, the Court noted that “even the 
highest possible [credentials] score does not guarantee admission to the 
Law School”39 and, by the same token, “a low score [does not] automatical-
ly disqualify an applicant.”40 
The Law School sought “to ensure that a critical mass of underrepresent-
ed minority students would be reached so as to realize the educational bene-
                                                             
33 Cf. Gayle Pollack, The Role of Race in Child Custody Decisions Between Natural Parents over Bira-
cial Children, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 603, 620 (1997) (“Biracial people may feel pressured 
to identify more strongly with their minority race … . [Or, they] may reject or negatively stereotype 
their minority heritage in an attempt to lay claim to what they may see as their part of the dominant ma-
jority.”). 
34 Cf. Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1490–91 (2000) 
(“Studies show, however, that Blacks in positions of prominence and authority tend to be lighter-
skinned. Thus, some employers may be hiring only a subset of the Black population, a subset selected, 
in part, based on skin color.”). 
35 Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319–20 (discussing testimony suggesting that “when a critical mass of un-
derrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority stu-
dents learn there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority stu-
dents.”). 
36 Cf. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (“It cannot be entertained as a serious proposition that all individuals 
of the same race think alike.”). 
37 539 U.S. at 311 (“This case requires us to decide whether the use of race as a factor in student admis-
sions by the University of Michigan Law School (Law School) is unlawful.”). 
38 Id. at 315. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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fits of a diverse student body.”41 However, that did not mean that there was 
a “particular number or percentage of underrepresented minority stu-
dents”42 that had to be admitted. Nonetheless, having a critical mass of mi-
nority of students was important for a variety of reasons. For example, 
“when a critical mass of underrepresented minority students is present, ra-
cial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students learn there is 
no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority 
students.”43 
The Grutter Court reaffirmed the applicability of the standard discussed 
in Gratz.44 Thus, “all racial classifications imposed by government ‘must be 
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny,’”45 which “means that 
such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to 
further compelling governmental interests.”46 The Court expressly refused 
to use a different level of scrutiny for a racial classification claimed to be 
benign rather than invidious.47 “‘Absent searching judicial inquiry into the 
justification for such race-based measures,’ we have no way to determine 
what ‘classifications are “benign” or “remedial” and what classifications are 
in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial 
politics.’”48  
The Grutter Court explained “the Law School has a compelling interest 
in attaining a diverse student body.”49 But even where the implicated state 
interest is compelling, government is still “constrained in how it may pur-
sue that end.”50 Unlike the program used by the University of Michigan in 
undergraduate admissions, “the Law School's admissions program bears the 
hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan.”51 That system did “not operate as a 
quota.”52  
Merely because the Law School’s admissions criteria did not operate as a 
quota did not end the analysis, because “a university's admissions program 
must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an 
individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or ethnicity the 
                                                             
41 Id. at 318. 
42 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318. 
43 Id. at 319-20. 
44 Id. at 343-44. 
45 Id. at 326 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
46 Id. 
47 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27. 
48 Id. (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)). 
49 Id. at 328. 
50 Id. at 333 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)). 
51 Id. at 334. 
52 Id. at 335. 
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defining feature of his or her application.”53 How could the Court be sure 
that race was not being weighed too heavily? The Court noted that the “Law 
School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test 
scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonmi-
nority applicants) who are rejected,”54 and then concluded that the “Law 
School's current admissions program considers race as one factor among 
many, in an effort to assemble a student body that is diverse in ways broad-
er than race.”55  
In the Court’s eyes, the Law School was not assigning inordinate 
weight56 to race because non-minority students with comparatively worse 
credentials were receiving offers of admission when minorities with better 
credentials were not.57 Nonetheless, it was not especially clear how the Law 
School admissions committee was operating, for example, whether race was 
given less comparable weight as a general matter or, instead, whether race 
was given much weight in some cases and less weight in others.58 Nor was 
it clear whether the reason that some qualified minority applicants were re-
fused admission to the law school but no qualified minority applicants were 
refused admission to the College59 was due to the admissions committee 
practices or, instead, to the quality of the minority applicant pool at the Col-
lege level.60  
Gratz and Grutter raised but did not answer a variety of questions, for 
example, when an institution was placing too much weight on racial diver-
sity.61 A separate issue involves the degree of deference that educational in-
                                                             
53 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 
54 Id. at 338. 
55 Id. at 340. 
56 Id. at 341; see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 296 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Any argument that the ‘tai-
loring’ amounts to a set-aside, then, boils down to the claim that a plus factor of 20 points makes some 
observers suspicious, where a factor of 10 points might not.”); but see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 280 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (illustrating how the majority in Gratz believed that too much weight was 
assigned to race). 
57 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341. 
58 Cf. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-73 ("The LSA's policy automatically distributes 20 points to every single 
applicant from an underrepresented minority' group, as defined by the University."), and Gratz, 539 U.S. 
at 273-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing how much weight was given in the undergraduate con-
text and the undergraduate committee’s refusal to vary how many points race would receive in individu-
al cases). 
59 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 254 (“[I]t is undisputed that the University admits ‘virtually every qualified ... 
applicant’ from these [minority] groups.”). 
60 See id. at 296 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that the university admits ‘virtually every qualified 
under- represented minority applicant’ may reflect nothing more than the likelihood that very few quali-
fied minority applicants apply . . . .”). 
61 Cf. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing Justice O’Connor’s implicit if not 
explicit criticism that too much weight was being assigned to race). 
8
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol20/iss1/3
 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION INVIDIOUSNESS 9 
stitutions should receive from the Court.62 An issue not raised in Grutter 
and Gratz is whether elementary and secondary schools employing racial 
classifications in admissions decisions should receive deference with re-
spect to their assessments of the need for school diversity.63 That issue, 
among others, was addressed in Parents Involved.64 
B. Parents Involved 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District in-
volved a constitutional challenge to public school districts that “voluntarily 
adopted student assignment plans that rely upon race to determine which 
public schools certain children may attend.”65 The Seattle and Louisville 
school districts whose policies were at issue had somewhat differing ap-
proaches.66 
In Seattle, students were allowed to list the public high schools “in order 
of preference.”67 Some schools were more popular than others.68 If a school 
was oversubscribed, certain tiebreakers were used. First, an individual with 
a sibling in the school would be given preference.69 Second, if the school’s 
racial composition was outside of the desired range, then individuals who 
would help the school achieve greater diversity would be given prefer-
ence.70 Third, if the previous tiebreakers were not dispositive, geographical 
proximity to the school would then be used as the tiebreaker.71 The plurality 
noted that while Seattle had never been subject to a court-ordered desegre-
gation plan and had never been found by a court to have operated racially 
segregated schools,72 it had nonetheless adopted the plan to combat “the ef-
                                                             
62 Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (“The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential 
to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”). 
63 See Generally Mark Strasser, Was Brown's Declaration of Per Se Invalidity Really Out of the Blue? 
The Evolving "Separate but Equal" Education Jurisprudence from Cumming to Brown, 47 How. L.J. 
769 (2004) (discussing how the Court has treated race-conscious decisions in college and post-graduate 
education versus primary and secondary schools). 
64 See infra Section B. 
65 551 U.S. 701, 709-10 (2007). 
66 Id. at 711 (“[T]he specifics of the two plans, and the circumstances surrounding their adoption, are in 
some respects quite different.”). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. (“Some schools are more popular than others.”). 
69 Id. at 711-12 (“The first tiebreaker selects for admission students who have a sibling currently en-
rolled in the chosen school.”). 
70 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 712 (“If an oversubscribed school is not within 10 percentage points of 
the district's overall white/nonwhite racial balance, it is what the district calls ‘integration positive,’ and 
the district employs a tiebreaker that selects for assignment students whose race ‘will serve to bring the 
school into balance.’”). 
71 Id. (“If it is still necessary to select students for the school after using the racial tiebreaker, the next 
tiebreaker is the geographic proximity of the school to the student's residence.”).  
72 Id. (“Seattle has never operated segregated schools—legally separate schools for students of different 
9
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fects of racially identifiable housing patterns on school assignments.”73 
In contrast, the Louisville school system was found to maintain a segre-
gated school system and was under court supervision.74 However, that su-
pervision ended in 2000.75 
Under the Louisville plan at issue in Parents Involved, each elementary 
school student was assigned a “resides” school based on where he or she 
lived.76 Students would be assigned to a non-magnet school based on their 
articulated preferences.77 However, if a school “has reached the ‘extremes 
of the racial guidelines,’”78 a student who would contribute to an even 
greater racial imbalance would not be assigned to that school.79 
When evaluating the constitutionality of the systems before it, the plural-
ity articulated the same standard that had been used in Gratz and Grutter: 
“In order to satisfy this searching standard of review, the school districts 
must demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications in the as-
signment plans here under review is ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘com-
pelling’ government interest.”80 The plurality then sought to show that the 
governing standard had not been met.81 
As an initial point, the plurality noted that neither system could claim 
that the policy was an attempt to combat the invidious effects of prior inten-
tional segregation,82 emphasizing that Seattle had never been under court 
supervision83 and that Louisville no longer was.84 The plurality then exam-
ined whether the race-based decision-making could be justified on another 
basis. 
Both school districts argued that “educational and broader socialization 
                                                                                                                                             
races—nor has it ever been subject to court-ordered desegregation.”). 
73 Id. (“[T]he effects of racially identifiable housing patterns on school assignments.”). 
74 Id. at 715. 
75 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 715-16. 
76 Id. at 716 (“At the elementary school level, based on his or her address, each student is designated a 
‘resides’ school to which students within a specific geographic area are assigned.”). 
77 Id. (“Parents of kindergartners, first graders, and students new to the district may submit an applica-
tion indicating a first and second choice among the schools within their cluster.”). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 716-17. (“If a school has reached the ‘extremes of the racial guidelines,’ a student whose race 
would contribute to the school's racial imbalance will not be assigned there.” (quoting App. in No. 05-
915, at 38-39, 82)). 
80 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227). 
81 See id. at 720-21. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 720 (“Yet the Seattle public schools have not shown that they were ever segregated by law, and 
were not subject to court-ordered desegregation decrees.”). 
84 Id. at 721 (“Once Jefferson County achieved unitary status, it had remedied the constitutional wrong 
that allowed race-based assignments. Any continued use of race must be justified on some other basis.”). 
10
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benefits flow from a racially diverse learning environment, and each [dis-
trict] contends that because the diversity they seek is racial diversity […] it 
makes sense to promote that interest directly by relying on race alone.”85 
The Parents Involved plurality rejected that the school districts’ announced 
ends passed constitutional muster.86 “However closely related race-based 
assignments may be to achieving racial balance, that itself cannot be the 
goal, whether labeled ‘racial diversity’ or anything else.”87 Rather than be-
ing the goal, racial diversity would have to be the means to achieve other 
desired goals.88 But the plurality rejected that the means adopted by the dis-
tricts met the narrow tailoring requirement.89 Indeed, the plurality believed 
the method chosen by the school districts undercut rather than promoted the 
stated goals,90 and summed up its understanding of the best approach to 
achieving equal treatment on the basis of race by writing: “The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race.”91  
Unlike the more deferential approach adopted by the Court in the case 
involving the University of Michigan Law School, the plurality rejected out 
of hand that deference should be accorded to local school boards. “Such 
deference ‘is fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence. 
We put the burden on state actors to demonstrate that their race-based poli-
cies are justified.’”92 
In his Parents Involved concurrence, Justice Kennedy suggested that 
“[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling edu-
cational goal a school district may pursue.”93 While rejecting the methods 
adopted by these school districts, he would be open, “if necessary, [to] a 
more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student character-
istics that might include race as a component.”94  
Justice Kennedy advised school districts to adopt approaches that did not 
                                                             
85 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 at 725-26. 
86 Id. at 726. 
87 Id. at 733. 
88 Id. at 733. 
89 Id. at 726 (“[I]t is clear that the racial classifications employed by the districts are not narrowly tai-
lored to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversi-
ty.”). 
90Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 733 (“To the extent the objective is sufficient diversity so that students 
see fellow students as individuals rather than solely as members of a racial group, using means that treat 
students solely as members of a racial group is fundamentally at cross-purposes with that end.”). 
91 Id. at 748. 
92 Id. at 744. (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 n.1 (2005). 
93 Id. at 783. (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
94 Id. at 790. 
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“tell[] each student he or she is to be defined by race.”95 While such pro-
grams might be “race conscious,”96 he nonetheless thought it unlikely “any 
of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.”97 For ex-
ample, he suggested:  
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse 
backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site selection 
of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the de-
mographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; re-
cruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, 
performance, and other statistics by race.
98
 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence makes it somewhat difficult to under-
stand the current jurisprudence in that he would find certain practices con-
stitutionally permissible that would presumably be found unconstitutional 
by the Parents Involved plurality.99 It is unclear whether the practices 
whose constitutionality he would uphold are only those outlined that alleg-
edly do not trigger strict scrutiny100 or whether in addition he would uphold 
certain “necessary […] nuanced [policies] […] that might include race as a 
component”101 even if triggering strict scrutiny. In any event, he left the 
door open to use race as a factor,102 although the next opinion he authored 
in this area cast doubt on his openness to employing express racial classifi-
cations in the educational admissions context.103  
C. Fisher 
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,104 the Court again examined 
                                                             
95 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 789. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Michael C. Dorf, Foreward: The Most Confusing Branch, 45 TULSA L. REV. 191, 192 (2009) (“Jus-
tice Kennedy split the difference. He would have permitted race-conscious measures that the plurality’s 
reasoning would have forbidden.). 
100 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is clear that the racial classifications 
employed by the districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social 
benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity.”). 
101 Id. at 790 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
102 Matthew Scutari, Note, “The Great Equalizer”: Making Sense of the Supreme Court’s Equal Protec-
tion Jurisprudence in American Public Education and Beyond, 97 GEO. L.J. 917, 938 (2009) (“Justice 
Kennedy’s controlling opinion suggests that race-conscious measures could be employed to achieve 
certain compelling interests, including avoiding racial isolation in schools and promoting diversity”). 
103 Eboni S. Nelson, Reading Between the Blurred Lines of Fisher v. University of Texas, 48 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 519, 522-23 (2014) (“If and when the current Court considers the constitutionality of future race-
based admissions policies, including that challenged in Fisher, it is doubtful that Justice Kennedy will be 
affirmative action’s saving grace as many have hoped.)”; See generally Jonathan W. Rash, Affirmative 
Action on Life Support: Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin and the End of Not-So-Strict-Scrutiny, 8 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 25 (2002). 
104 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
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the use of race in the higher education context, this time by the University 
of Texas at Austin. The university made use of the Top Ten program, which 
“grants automatic admission to any public state college, including the Uni-
versity, to all students in the top 10% of their class at high schools in Texas 
that comply with certain standards.”105 To supplement their consideration 
of grades and test scores, the University also considered a “‘Personal 
Achievement Index’ (PAI), [which] measures a student's leadership and 
work experience, awards, extracurricular activities, community service, and 
other special circumstances that give insight into a student's back-
ground.”106 That program was helpful in increasing the diversity of the stu-
dent population.107 
After the United States Supreme Court issued Grutter, the University of 
Texas modified its admissions process.108 This modification included ex-
press consideration of race in the PAI.109 When examining the University’s 
use of race, the Fisher Court reaffirmed the appropriate standard: “Race 
may not be considered unless the admissions process can withstand strict 
scrutiny.”110 The Court also reaffirmed that strict scrutiny is a daunting test. 
“Strict scrutiny is a searching examination, and it is the government that 
bears the burden to prove ‘that the reasons for any [racial] classification 
[are] clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate.’”111  
The Court noted that strict scrutiny would be employed when examining 
both the end sought and the means used to achieve that end.112 “Once the 
University has established that its goal of diversity is consistent with strict 
scrutiny, however, there must still be a further judicial determination that 
the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementation.”113 For 
example, the reviewing court must “verify that it is ‘necessary’ for a univer-
sity to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.”114  
                                                             
105 Id. at 2416. 
106 Id. at 2415-16. 
107 Id. at 2416 (“The University’s revised admissions process, coupled with the operation of the Top 
Ten Percent Law, resulted in a more racially diverse environment at the University.”). 
108 Id. (“Following this Court’s decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger . . . and Gratz v. Bollinger . . . the Uni-
versity adopted a third admissions program . . . .”). 
109 133 S. Ct. at 2416 (“[T]he University included a student’s race as a component of the PAI score . . . 
.”). 
110 Id. at 2418. 
111 Id. at 2419 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989)). 
112 See id. at 2420 (“The University must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain diver-
sity are narrowly tailored to that goal.”); See id. at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he educational 
benefits allegedly produced by diversity must rise to the level of a compelling state interest in order for 
the program to survive strict scrutiny.”). 
113 Id. at 2419-20. 
114 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978)). 
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The Fisher Court noted that the Fifth Circuit had been rather deferential, 
only requiring that the University acted in good faith.115 However, the 
Court explained, “Grutter did not hold that good faith would forgive an im-
permissible consideration of race.”116 The Court remanded the case to the 
Fifth Circuit.117 
On remand, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the constitutionality of the Uni-
versity of Texas approach.118 The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to consider whether the Fifth Circuit’s holding was correct,119 and 
affirmed.120 
The Fisher II Court reiterated that racial classifications must be exam-
ined with strict scrutiny121 and that no deference would be given to univer-
sities with respect to whether their chosen means is narrowly tailored to 
promoting diversity.122 Ultimately, the Court found that the particular sys-
tem at issue passed muster, perhaps because it was sui generis.123 That said, 
merely because the University of Texas policy survived this challenge does 
not mean that the same policy would survive a constitutional challenge ten 
years from now because the University has a “continuing obligation to sat-
isfy the burden of strict scrutiny in light of changing circumstances.”124 
The jurisprudence from Grutter and Gratz through Parents Involved and 
Fisher suggests that race-conscious admissions procedures in education are 
constitutionally permissible under certain conditions. Because the Court 
does not distinguish between benign and animus-based racial discrimina-
tion, express racial classifications will be examined with strict scrutiny. 
Such classifications will be struck down as violating equal protection guar-
antees unless narrowly tailored to promote compelling state interests. How-
ever, Schuette may modify that understanding.  
                                                             
115 See id. (“[T]he Court of Appeals held petitioner could challenge only ‘whether [the University’s] 
decision to reintroduce race as a factor in admission was made in good faith.’” (citing Fisher v. Univ. of 
Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 236 (5th Cir. 2011))). 
116 Id. at 2421. 
117 Id. at 2422 (“The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.”). 
118 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758, 633, 660 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2888 
(2015). 
119 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015) (granting certiorari). 
120 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016). 
121 See id. at 2208. 
122 Id. 
123 See id. 
124 Id. at 2209–2210. 
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II. SCHUETTE AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
The state of Michigan adopted by referendum a constitutional amend-
ment that, inter alia, precluded discriminating against or granting preferen-
tial treatment to anyone on the basis of his or her race. That amendment was 
challenged as a violation of federal equal protection guarantees. When up-
holding the constitutionality of the amendment, the United States Supreme 
Court offered an analysis that was difficult to understand in light of the pre-
vailing jurisprudence. 
A. Schuette 
At issue in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action was the 
constitutionality of a state constitutional amendment adopted by referen-
dum.125 The amendment read: 
(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State Uni-
versity, and any other public college or university, community college, or 
school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, 
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national 
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public con-
tracting. 
(2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, 
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national 
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public con-
tracting.
126
 
On its face, the amendment classifies on the basis of race, among other 
categories, and an important determination involves the level of scrutiny 
that should be employed when examining the constitutionality of the en-
actment. While the plurality did not provide an analysis that was as clear 
and detailed as one might like with respect to the appropriate standard of 
review, the Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that strict scrutiny 
was triggered,127 and it will be helpful to see why. 
The Sixth Circuit had read Washington v. Seattle School District128 as 
holding that “any state action with a ‘racial focus’ that makes it ‘more diffi-
cult for certain racial minorities than for other groups’ to ‘achieve legisla-
                                                             
125 Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action et al., 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014) (“The Court 
in this case must determine whether an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Michigan, ap-
proved and enacted by its voters, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”). 
126 Id. (citing Mich. Const. art. I, § 26). 
127 See id. at 1634. 
128 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
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tion that is in their interest’ is subject to strict scrutiny.”129 The Schuette 
plurality criticized that approach as likely inconsistent with the current ju-
risprudence.130 After all, talking about which legislation is in a particular 
group’s interest suggests a uniformity of interests that might not exist.131 
In cautioning against “impermissible racial stereotypes,” this Court has rejected 
the assumption that “members of the same racial group—regardless of their 
age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think 
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at 
the polls.”
132
  
The plurality further cautioned, “[I]f it were deemed necessary to probe 
how some races define their own interest in political matters, still another 
beginning point would be to define individuals according to race.”133 But 
such a project would itself pose significant problems. “[I]n a society in 
which those lines are becoming more blurred, the attempt to define race-
based categories also raises serious questions of its own.”134 
Even if those problems could be solved, there would be additional diffi-
culties in determining which policies benefited particular groups. Allegedly, 
the Sixth Circuit approach “would risk … the creation of incentives for 
those who support or oppose certain policies to cast the debate in terms of 
racial advantage or disadvantage.”135  
Consider how different groups react to affirmative action policies. Some 
believe they are not only beneficial but necessary,136 whereas others claim 
such policies are harmful.137 Whether employing racial classifications is 
more beneficial than harmful is an empirical matter.138  
                                                             
129 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (citing Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474). 
130 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (“The expansive reading of Seattle has no principled limitation and rais-
es serious questions of compatibility with the Court’s settled equal protection jurisprudence.”). 
131 Id. at 1634. (“It cannot be entertained as a serious proposition that all individuals of the same race 
think alike.”). 
132 Id. (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)). 
133 Id. 
134 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634. 
135 Id. at 1635. 
136 See William B. Turner, “A Bulwark Against Anarchy”: Affirmative Action, Emory Law School, and 
Southern Self-Help, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 195, 247 (2008) (discussing the view that af-
firmative action is both beneficial and necessary). 
137 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(stating that affirmative action programs can be “poisonous and pernicious” and “stamp minorities with 
a badge of inferiority”). 
138 See Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697, 698 (1999) (reviewing 
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS. (1990) (“[T]he authors demonstrate 
that the benefits of affirmative action far outweigh the costs, suggesting that affirmative action is, in-
deed, a desirable social bargain. This is not to suggest… that affirmative action is costless or a panacea 
16
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The Schuette plurality suggested the Constitution does not require or 
even permit the cost/benefit assessment of racial preferences to be decided 
by the courts rather than the electorate.139 Indeed, the suggestion that this 
was not a matter to be left to the voters was “demeaning to the democratic 
process,”140 because taking such a decision away from the electorate would 
“presume that the voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensi-
tivity on decent and rational grounds.”141 
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts asserted both that reasonable 
people might disagree about whether affirmative action is more beneficial 
than harmful142 and that impugning the motivation of those criticizing racial 
preferences was itself harmful.143 He seemed especially interested in reject-
ing the proposition that “it is […] ‘out of touch with reality’ to conclude 
that racial preferences may themselves […] do more harm than good.”144 
Justice Scalia in his concurrence asked rhetorically, “Does the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbid what its text plainly re-
quires?”145 Echoing his concurring and dissenting opinion in Grutter, Jus-
tice Scalia suggested that the “Constitution proscribes government 
discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no ex-
ception.”146 He rejected that a compelling interest in diversity permits a 
university to employ a racial classification.147 
Members of the Court clearly disagree about whether race-conscious pol-
icies promote more harm than good.148 Yet, a more basic question for con-
                                                                                                                                             
for our social ills--it is neither.“). 
139 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638 (“There is no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in this 
Court’s precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this policy determination to 
the voters.” (citing Sailors v. Board of Ed. of City of Kent, 387 U.S. 105, 109 (1967)). 
140 Id. at 1637. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 1639 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“People can disagree in good faith on this issue.”). 
143 Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[I]t similarly does more harm than good to question the openness 
and candor of those on either side of the debate.”). 
144 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638-39 (quoting Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1675-76 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).  
145 Id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
146 Id. (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
147 Cf. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“The petitioner in this case 
did not ask us to overrule Grutter’s holding that a ‘compelling interest’ in the educational benefits of 
diversity can justify racial preferences in university admissions. I therefore join the Court’s opinion in 
full.”). 
148 Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Beyond 
the harm the Law School’s racial discrimination visits upon its test subjects, no social science has dis-
proved the notion that this discrimination ‘engender[s] attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, pro-
voke[s] resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s use of 
race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop de-
pendencies or to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ top references.”) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and con-
17
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stitutional purposes is whether the Michigan amendment employs a race-
based classification and, if so, whether that classification triggers strict 
scrutiny. 
B. What Counts as a Racial Classification? 
The current equal protection jurisprudence requires strict scrutiny of all 
racial classifications.149 The Michigan amendment expressly incorporated 
race as a forbidden category upon which to award benefits or impose bur-
dens, and a basic question is whether the express inclusion of race itself op-
erates as a racial classification. The plurality implicitly and Justice Scalia 
explicitly denied that the Michigan amendment classified on the basis of 
race, and that denial must be explored. 
Justice Scalia addressed the question directly, noting the respondents ar-
gued it was unnecessary to discern whether the Michigan electorate had 
passed the amendment out of animus, because “§ 26 may be struck more 
straightforwardly as a racial ‘classification.’”150 He quickly dismissed that 
contention because “§ 26 does not on its face ‘distribut[e] burdens or bene-
fits on the basis of individual racial classifications.’”151 Because in his view 
there was no distribution of benefits or burdens on that basis, the amend-
ment should be treated as if it were racially neutral. He continued, “[T]he 
question in this case, as in every case in which neutral state action is said to 
deny equal protection on account of race, is whether the action reflects a ra-
cially discriminatory purpose.”152 
In what sense was the amendment neutral? It prohibited using race as a 
plus factor or as a minus factor when deciding who would receive an offer 
of admission. In what way was this not neutral? Other groups would not 
need to pass a state constitutional amendment before they could receive 
preferential treatment on their preferred basis. Thus, Justice Scalia was cor-
rect that the Michigan amendment was neutral in that it did not privilege 
one race over another, but incorrect in that one classification (race) could 
not be used as a basis for preferential treatment in admissions while other 
                                                                                                                                             
curring in the judgment)), with Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1680 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The elimina-
tion of race-sensitive admissions policies in California has been especially harmful to black students.”). 
149 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (“[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any gov-
ernmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to une-
qual treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.”). 
150 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1647-48 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
151 Id. at 1648 (alteration in original) (citing Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007)). 
152 Id. at 1648 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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bases (geography, income) could be so used.153 
If the Michigan amendment was neutral in one sense but not in another, 
then it is important to figure out which sense of neutrality is used in equal 
protection jurisprudence. Consider Hunter v. Erickson.154 At issue was the 
following city charter amendment adopted by referendum: 
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates 
the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, lease, sublease or fi-
nancing of real property of any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of 
race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry must first be approved by a ma-
jority of the electors voting on the question at a regular or general election be-
fore said ordinance shall be effective. Any such ordinance in effect at the time 
of the adoption of this section shall cease to be effective until approved by the 
electors as provided herein.
155
 
The charter amendment did not itself directly accord benefits or impose 
burdens on the basis of race, and the Hunter Court recognized the amend-
ment was neutral within certain categories. “It is true that the section draws 
no distinctions among racial and religious groups. Negroes and whites, 
Jews and Catholics are all subject to the same requirements if there is hous-
ing discrimination against them which they wish to end.”156 Using Justice 
Scalia’s sense of neutrality, the Akron amendment was neutral. But the 
Hunter Court examined this amendment with strict scrutiny, viewing it as a 
racial classification.157 In what way was it harmful? Certain groups could 
only receive protections from the City after securing voter ratification of 
those protections, while other groups did not need voter ratification to make 
city council protections effective. When striking down the amendment, the 
Hunter Court noted, “[T]he State may no more disadvantage any particular 
group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it 
may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than 
another of comparable size.”158  
It is fair to suggest that in some ways Hunter no longer represents the 
current jurisprudence. The Hunter Court struck down the amendment be-
cause it “discriminates against minorities, and constitutes a real, substantial, 
and invidious denial of the equal protection of the laws.”159 But the current 
                                                             
153 See id. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“As a result of § 26, there are now two very different 
processes through which a Michigan citizen is permitted to influence the admissions policies of the 
State's universities: one for persons interested in race-sensitive admissions policies and one for everyone 
else.”). 
154 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
155 Id. at 387. 
156 Id. at 390. 
157 See id. at 391-92. 
158 Id. at 393 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). 
159 Hunter, 393 U.S. at 385 (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533). 
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jurisprudence neither requires nor permits the Court to decide whether stat-
utes containing express racial classifications are more beneficial than harm-
ful. Instead, the current jurisprudence requires all such statutes to be exam-
ined with strict scrutiny,160 which is why it was somewhat surprising for 
some of the Court members to air their differing views about the costs and 
benefits of racial preferences.161 According to the current jurisprudence, it 
does not matter whether the justices believe race-conscious admission poli-
cies a good idea or a bad one—strict scrutiny is triggered in either event.162  
The position offered here that the Michigan amendment should have 
been subjected to strict scrutiny might seem open to the following objec-
tion: If a state constitutional amendment bars discrimination on the basis of 
race, then its having expressly included race in the state constitution would 
trigger strict scrutiny, which would mean the state constitution provision 
could not include such a provision unless narrowly tailored to promote a 
compelling interest. But it would seem absurd to strike down a state consti-
tutional provision barring racial discrimination. 
Yet, there are a number of reasons this objection proves unavailing. First, 
suppose such a prohibition did trigger strict scrutiny. The Court would pre-
sumably say that prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race was nar-
rowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest. 
Second, if indeed the state constitutional amendment was simply mirror-
ing Fourteenth Amendment protections and if the state constitutional 
amendment was interpreted in a way that tracked Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection guarantees, then Justice Scalia’s rhetorical question would 
seem apt. “Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
forbid what its text plainly requires?”163 Presumably, the Fourteenth 
Amendment would not invalidate a state measure that merely reiterated fed-
eral constitutional requirements.  
Suppose for whatever reason the Court would strike down a state consti-
tutional provision barring racial discrimination if that amendment had to be 
subjected to strict scrutiny. Even if the Fourteenth Amendment were inter-
preted to require invalidation of a state constitutional provision mirroring 
federal requirements, that would merely mean the state would still have to 
                                                             
160 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1674 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Justice Scalia . . . would acknowledge . 
. . that an act that draws racial distinctions or makes racial classifications triggers strict scrutiny regard-
less of whether discriminatory intent is shown. That should settle the matter: Section 26 draws a racial 
distinction.”). 
161 See supra notes 133-38, 140-45 and accompanying text; See also supra note 139 (Roberts, J., con-
curring) (citing Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
162 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1663 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
163 Id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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abide by the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment rather than 
being forced to abide by the requirements because of both federal and state 
constitutional guarantees. 
The qualification above about the state amendment mirroring federal 
guarantees must be emphasized because it suggests where Justice Scalia’s 
analysis is in error. Even without the Michigan amendment, Michigan state 
universities could not accord preferences based on race unless narrowly tai-
lored to promote compelling state interests. To the extent the Michigan 
amendment merely prohibits what the Fourteenth Amendment bars anyway, 
the state constitutional amendment has no real effect. But the Michigan 
amendment precludes according preferences on race even when doing so is 
narrowly tailored to promote compelling state interests, which is going 
above and beyond what the Fourteenth Amendment requires. Basically, the 
Michigan amendment precludes the state from affording benefits on the ba-
sis of race that would be permissible under the Federal Constitution, and 
such a denial of possible benefits should have been examined with strict 
scrutiny.164 It is difficult to see how denying the possibility that minorities 
might receive additional educational benefits would be narrowly tailored to 
promote a compelling state interest. Thus, although Justice Scalia is correct 
that the Fourteenth Amendment would not bar a state from having within its 
own constitution a provision mirroring the requirements of the Federal 
Constitution, he is incorrect to imply that a state constitutional provision 
would be immune from invalidation if that provision denied opportunities 
to minorities that were permissibly accorded in light of federal constitution-
al guarantees.165 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has decided several cases involving express consideration of 
race in school admissions and in each case employed strict scrutiny when 
evaluating the constitutionality of the policy at issue.166 The Court has ex-
pressly rejected distinguishing between benign and animus- based classifi-
cations, believing that all racial classifications must be subjected to exacting 
consideration. Such a policy has costs, since it means that the state cannot 
adopt race-based programs unless those programs are narrowly tailored to 
promote compelling interests. 
In Schuette, the plurality ignored its own jurisprudence to achieve a re-
                                                             
164 Id. at 1663 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
165 Id. at 1673 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 
457, 487 (1982)). 
166 See, e.g., Fisher, 134 S. Ct. at 2415; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. 
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sult, which at least some suggest is racially discriminatory.167 For example, 
the plurality refused to impute animus to the electorate when adopting the 
amendment at issue by referendum.168 But the Court has already eschewed 
treating benignly motivated racial classification more deferentially, so it 
should not matter why the electorate adopted the measure. So, too, the dis-
cussion about whether race-conscious measures benefit or harm racial mi-
norities was also beside the point. Whether helping or hurting minorities, an 
express racial classification must be subjected to strict scrutiny. 
If one combines Schuette with the other cases on race-conscious school 
admissions, one comes up with the following constitutional rule: Attempts 
by the State to accord benefits on the basis of race will only be upheld if 
narrowly tailored to promote compelling interests. However, if the State 
passes a law expressly prohibiting state entities from according constitu-
tionally permissible benefits to racial minorities, that prohibition will not 
trigger close scrutiny.  
Such a policy at least appears to be stacked against racial minorities,169 
which might make individuals question whether members of the Court are 
really committed to promoting equality and fair treatment.170 Schuette not 
only ignores the past jurisprudence and denies minorities possible benefits, 
but it may cause people to question either the integrity or the perspicacity of 
various members of the Court. Schuette must be overruled at the first oppor-
tunity.  
  
                                                             
167 Girardeau A. Spann, Good Faith Discrimination, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 608 (2015) 
(“The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, upholding 
the Michigan anti-affirmative action voter initiative, provides another illustration of how the Court’s 
holdings can be racially discriminatory.”). 
168 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1637 (“It is demeaning to the democratic process to presume that the vot-
ers are not capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.”). 
169 See Spann, supra note 167, at 608 (“Schuette seems to have adopted a one-way ratchet approach to 
affirmative action, pursuant to which the Supreme Court defers to the preferences of the political process 
when the political process chooses to reject affirmative action, but invalidates the preferences of the po-
litical process when the political process chooses to adopt affirmative action.”). 
170 Id. at 593 (“[I]t sometimes appears as if the Supreme Court is manipulating the two categories in 
ways that end up legitimating racial discrimination.”).   
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